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Abstract
This study investigates belief in company paternalism as an indicator of the “right 
type” for line managers in leading Japanese corporations. In five companies, 1,075 
line managers were surveyed about their belief in company paternalism, their ex-
perience with both the formal and informal career-development systems within 
their company, their working relationships with their immediate superior (LMX), 
and their overall job satisfaction. Results indicated that belief in company pater-
nalism contributed as hypothesized to formal career investments, informal career 
investments (including both self-investment and supervisor investment), LMX, 
and overall job satisfaction. These relationships held true both before and after 
experiences with the formal career-development system were controlled. Impli-
cations of right type for American organizations are discussed. 
An investigation of Japanese management development conducted 
by Graen and colleagues (Graen, Wakabayashi, Graen, & Graen, 1990; 
Wakabayashi, 1980; Wakabayashi & Graen, 1984; Wakabayashi, Graen, 
Graen, & Graen, 1988; Wakabayashi et al., 1980) spanning 13 years of 
Japanese line managers’ career progress from organizational entry to 
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advancement into middle management has provided new insight into 
career progress within Japanese management systems. For example, in 
contrast to previous speculation that Japanese management progress is 
“lock-step,” it was determined that Japanese line managers, analogous 
to their Western counterparts, experience differentiation in career prog-
ress throughout their careers (Wakabayashi et al., 1988; Wakabayashi, 
Graen, & Uhl-Bien, 1990). This differentiation occurs through a process 
of “hidden investments” (Graen, 1989). According to this career-prog-
ress model, managers who eventually vie for the executive suite are 
identified early in their careers and prepared for their entry into the up-
per echelons through hidden investments that occur throughout their 
careers (Wakabayashi et al., 1990). 
As demonstrated in the 13-year cohort study and in subsequent 
studies investigating Japanese career progress (Wakabayashi & Graen, 
1984; Wakabayashi et al., 1988; Wakabayashi et al., 1990), however, not 
all Japanese line managers are able to receive the career investments 
that put them on the fast track in terms of career progress. Rather, it 
was found that a key contributor to attainment of the fast track in Japa-
nese organizations is the Japanese line managers’ success in developing 
high-quality leadership relationships with their supervisors. These rela-
tionships influence attainment of the fast track through increased career 
investments that line managers involved in the relationships receive. In 
particular, by becoming involved in high-quality leadership relation-
ships, line managers receive the types of increased career investments 
from their supervisors that have been found to be positively related 
to career progress within Japanese systems (Wakabayashi et al., 1988; 
Wakabayashi et al., 1990). 
Given the importance of establishing high-quality leader-member re-
lationships and attaining hidden investments in one’s career for entry to 
the fast track, the question of interest that arises is, What types of indi-
viduals in Japanese organizations are most likely to develop high-quality 
LMX relationships successfully and thus receive increased investments in 
their careers ? In other words, is there some personal characteristic that 
gives its possessor a competitive advantage in terms of career progress 
within Japanese corporations? If so, the identification of this personal 
characteristic would provide insight into what type of individual is able 
to advance successfully within the Japanese management hierarchy. 
Thus the purpose of the present study is to investigate what consti-
tutes the right type of worker for the Japanese management system. In 
order to understand better how career progress occurs within Japanese 
management systems, however, we turn next to a discussion of the char-
acteristics of career-development systems within Japanese organizations. 
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Career Investments 
As in most organizations, career development in Japanese corpo-
rations is contingent upon the types of career investments the devel-
oping managers receive (Yoshino, 1968). These career investments are 
growth opportunities bestowed upon organizational members to help 
them learn and develop on the job. Individuals who receive greater ca-
reer investments are generally better trained and better prepared to ac-
cept the responsibilities that come with advancement through the orga-
nizational hierarchy. In Japanese organizations, career investments occur 
on two levels: formal career investment, carried out by the company ca-
reer-development system, and informal career investments, conducted 
through a process of hidden investments (Graen, 1989). Formal career in-
vestments, which involve programming formal career-development ac-
tivities for each organizational member, are managed by the personnel 
departments in these organizations. Informal career investments, on the 
other hand, are conducted at the discretion of individual organizational 
members and others around them who may take an interest in their ca-
reer development. 
Formal Career-Development System 
The formal career-development system in Japanese organizations is 
quite different from that of the leading American corporations. In con-
trast to American systems in which the personnel department plays a re-
duced role in the promotion and development activities of organizational 
members, personnel departments in Japanese organizations play a cen-
tral role in the career planning of their line managers. In particular, Jap-
anese personnel departments are largely responsible for monitoring the 
career-development activities of each organizational member and deter-
mining the career paths that these individuals will take. 
As part of this process, personnel sections, not departmental super-
visors, take responsibility for administering the periodic performance 
evaluations by which employee career progress is monitored. In addi-
tion, the personnel section identifies the training requirements of each 
employee based on the individual experiences and needs of the em-
ployee. From this information, members of the personnel department, 
acting as representatives of the formal career-development system, de-
termine the promotability of each employee and then program career 
paths for each organizational member based on a standard schedule 
modified for individual needs. By defining which career path individ-
ual managers will follow, the company career-development system may 
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play a significant role in establishing the career progress of each organi-
zational member. 
Informal “Hidden-Investment” Career-Development System 
Along with investments made by the formal career-development sys-
tem within the organization, career investments may also occur on an 
informal level through a process of hidden investments (Wakabayashi 
et al., 1988). Hidden investments represent special growth opportuni-
ties for certain individuals. These investments may originate from sev-
eral sources, but their primary source is the high-quality exchange rela-
tionship (LMX) between the focal manager and his immediate supervisor 
(Wakabayashi et al., 1990). 
As part of the high-quality leader-member exchange (LMX) relation-
ship, supervisors invest more of their own valuable resources in the ca-
reers of the selected subordinates (Graen & Scandura, 1987; Graen, 1989). 
Through this investment, high-quality LMX subordinates are given 
greater opportunities to develop in their jobs. For example, supervisor in-
vestment in a high-LMX subordinate may involve providing the subordi-
nate with special attention and support, offering the subordinate inside 
information about the organization, delegating extra influence and au-
thority to the subordinate, offering the subordinate latitude in the perfor-
mance of his job, providing the subordinate extra access to departmental 
resources, and allowing the subordinate to participate in critical assign-
ments (Wakabayashi et al., 1990). As a result of these investment pro-
cesses, high-quality subordinates become well-trained, trusted assistants, 
upon whom the supervisor may rely for assistance. For the developing 
line managers, these increased investments offer growth opportunities 
that are often essential for career progress within the organization. 
In addition to supervisor investment, informal hidden-investment 
processes also include self-investment activities performed by the indi-
vidual managers (Wakabayashi et al., 1990). These self-investment activ-
ities occur when individuals in organizations agree to grow out of their 
formal jobs through the acceptance of additional responsibilities not 
specified in their formal job descriptions (Graen, 1989; Graen & Wak-
abayashi, in press). Potential self-investment behaviors may include ac-
tivities such as increasing technical expertise by performing new tasks, 
expanding one’s competence network, taking risks on the job, building 
exchange relationships with coworkers, searching for new opportunities 
for self-improvement, and generally managing one’s own career. In ad-
dition, line managers may become proactive in their career progress by 
working to develop high-quality relationships with their supervisors and 
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thus gain access to the valuable resources discussed earlier (Graen, 1989; 
Wakabayashi et al., 1990). 
When taken in combination, supervisor and self hidden-investment 
processes are extremely beneficial to the manager receiving the invest-
ment, the supervisor, and the organization as a whole. Organizational 
members who receive career investments benefit from increased oppor-
tunity for advancement within the organization, whereas the supervisor 
and the organization benefit by employing a well-trained, highly depend-
able worker. Moreover, these activities may be complementary, in that 
self-investment activities may result in development of higher LMX rela-
tionships and, subsequently, increased supervisor investment in the de-
veloping manager. In addition to increased informal career investments, 
individuals participating in hidden-investment activities may also indi-
rectly influence formal career investments through the high-potential im-
age these activities reflect. 
Although both types of career-development systems are influential in 
career progress, they differ in the amount of control they permit to de-
veloping managers. In contrast to formal career-development systems, in 
which career investments are regulated through highly structured sys-
tems, informal hidden-investment processes offer developing managers 
much greater opportunities for self-control over career progress. Indeed, 
hidden investments require line managers to take an active stance, be-
cause these investments do not come unless managers are willing to en-
gage in self-investment activities and grow out of their jobs. In addition, 
any influence managers may sustain over the formal career-development 
system would likely be gained through hidden-investment activities in 
which they participate. Hence, in contrast to formal career-develop-
ment systems, hidden investments allow managers a vehicle with which 
they can take a proactive role in career development. Consequently, it is 
through the hidden-investment process that right types of line manag-
ers would be expected to differentiate themselves from their less quali-
fied co-workers. 
Thus career-development systems in Japanese organizations may af-
fect a line manager’s career progress in two ways: through a more for-
malized public face career-development system, in which the company 
programs formal career-development activities for each line manager, or 
through a more informal hidden-investment system, in which line man-
agers (through their supervisors) engage in career-development activities 
by growing out of their formal job descriptions. In the next section, these 
two types of career-development systems will be discussed in terms of 
their implications for identification of the right type of worker for the Jap-
anese management system. 
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Company Paternalism 
As discussed above, both formal and informal career-development 
systems have an impact on Japanese line managers’ career progress. Al-
though we have a general understanding of how these processes op-
erate, however, it is still unclear which individual characteristics de-
termine whether a line manager within this Japanese system will be 
successful in advancing through the Japanese management hierarchy. 
In the following paragraphs, one possible individual attribute of the 
right type of Japanese worker, belief in company paternalism, will be 
presented and discussed. 
Japanese management systems have been described in many ways: in 
terms of lifetime employment and commitment, company loyalty, mu-
tual trust, cooperation and conformity, familial management, and group 
harmony (Alston, 1989; Befu, 1980; Ouchi, 1981). Although it is difficult 
to select just one of these characteristics as being more important to the 
effectiveness of the system than another, it is possible to identify one 
characteristic of the system from which most of the others emerge: the 
belief in company paternalism. The mutual belief among Japanese man-
agers and workers that the relationship between the company and em-
ployee is paternalistic in nature fosters many of the other characteristics 
described above: trust among workers and managers, cooperation and 
harmony throughout the organization (because everyone works together 
for the good of the whole), lifetime employment and commitment (be-
cause a family member is a family member for life), and so on. Because 
company paternalism is central to the effective functioning of the Japa-
nese system, it would follow that attitudes toward company paternalism 
held by workers would play a significant role in determining the compat-
ibility of the workers with the management system. 
Based on this, one reasonable candidate for a right type of worker for 
the Japanese management system would likely be someone with strong 
beliefs in company paternalism (Abegglen, 1957; Befu, 1980; Marsh & 
Mannari, 1971; Ouchi, 1981). Such employees would place their trust, loy-
alty, and indeed, their careers, in the hands of the company. They would 
place the interests of their company above their own and take a career-
long perspective on their treatment by the company. Even when tem-
porarily disadvantaged in their career progress, they would believe that 
their commitment would be rewarded in the future. Conversely, individ-
uals with weak beliefs in company paternalism, who represent a “non-
right type,” would feel that their relationship with the company is pri-
marily economic and contractual and thus would not be willing to make 
the extra commitment to the organization made by their high-paternal-
ism (Hi-Pat) counterparts. 
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It is important to note here that this conception of belief in company 
paternalism differs from the American view of paternalism. In contrast 
to Americans, who typically perceive the concept negatively, the Japa-
nese place a very positive value on company paternalism. Americans 
often perceive company paternalism as making them dependent upon 
and subservient to the company. Among Japanese workers, however, 
belief in putting one’s fate in the hands of the company and relating 
to the company as the head of one’s extended family has a very posi-
tive connotation. Company housing, country clubs, paid vacations, and 
other benefits are seen as earned by employees rather than as gifts to 
retainers. Indeed, policies of lifetime employment, career-long train-
ing and development, and company paternalism have been hallmarks 
of the leading Japanese corporations since the 1950s (Abegglen, 1957; 
Sethi, Namiki, & Swanson, 1984) and have been maintained with very 
few exceptions since that time. 
This success of Japanese corporations in promoting paternalistic 
feelings throughout their work force suggests that paternalism may 
be a key factor in identifying those individuals who are more compat-
ible with these types of systems. For example, because those who have 
a strong belief in company paternalism place the interests of the com-
pany above their own and take a career-long perspective of their treat-
ment by the company, it would follow that these individuals would 
demonstrate more commitment to the welfare of the company. These 
“high-paternals” (Hi-Pats) would thus be more likely to invest more of 
themselves in the company. One way in which they may demonstrate 
their increased commitment to the organization would be by agreeing 
to take on additional responsibilities outside of their formal job descrip-
tions. In other words, because they are more committed to the organi-
zation, these individuals would be more likely to do more than they 
are formally required because they are concerned about the welfare of 
the organization. According to the hidden-investment process as de-
scribed above, these individuals, by agreeing to take on additional re-
sponsibilities, would thus be engaging in greater self-investment activi-
ties in their career. In addition, by agreeing to grow out of their jobs, the 
Hi-Pats would also be more likely to receive greater supervisor invest-
ment in their careers. Hence, in terms of hidden career investment, it 
would appear that Hi-Pat line managers would be more likely to be in-
volved in the hidden-investment process within Japanese corporations 
than would Lo-Pat line managers. 
In addition to implications for the informal Japanese career-develop-
ment system, belief in company paternalism may also have implications 
for the formal Japanese career-development system. Because Hi-Pat in-
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dividuals are demonstrating greater commitment to the organization by 
taking on additional responsibilities, it is likely that these individuals 
would be recognized by the formal career-development system as high-
potential employees. As such, Hi-Pat employees would be more likely to 
receive more favorable treatment from the formal career-development 
system, and thus once again have a competitive advantage in terms of ca-
reer progress over their Lo-Pat counterparts. 
It appears, then, that belief in company paternalism may have signifi-
cant implications for our understanding of the “right types” of individu-
als for Japanese organizations. Specifically, belief in company paternalism 
may act as an indicant of those individuals who will be more successful 
in attaining increased career investments and thus advancing more rap-
idly and to higher levels in the Japanese hierarchy. 
The Right Type of Worker for Japanese Management Systems 
Because of the roles formal and informal investments play in influ-
encing career progress within Japanese organizations (Alston, 1989; Wak-
abayashi et al., in press), examination of the types of individuals who 
benefit more greatly from these investments would provide an indication 
of the right type of worker for Japanese management systems. In other 
words, those individuals who are the right type for Japanese manage-
ment systems appear to be the individuals who are better able to gain in-
creased investments (formal and informal) in their careers, because these 
investments have been demonstrated to have a positive effect on subse-
quent career progress within Japanese organizations (Wakabayashi et al., 
1990). Moreover, because the informal career-development system allows 
individual workers more self-control over their career progress, any dif-
ferentiation between right types and non-right types would more likely 
be revealed in the informal hidden-investment system rather than in the 
formal career-development system. 
As discussed, Hi-Pat workers appears to fit this description of right 
types of workers. Because Hi-Pats are more highly committed to the or-
ganization, they can be expected to invest more of themselves in the or-
ganization in an unselfish manner. These individuals internalize the 
goals and values of the organization and are interested in enhancing their 
career progress within the company. Because of this, Hi-Pat employees 
would be more likely to take a more proactive role in their career-devel-
opment activities than would their less paternalistic co-workers. In par-
ticular, Hi-Pat workers would be expected to engage in more self-invest-
ment activities on the job and, subsequently, to develop higher-quality 
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exchange relationships with their supervisors than their Lo-Pat counter-
parts. These individuals would then become the high-LMX subordinates 
in whom the supervisor would place greater career investments. In addi-
tion, because of their greater participation in hidden-investment activi-
ties, Hi-Pat line managers would be more likely to report receiving more 
favorable treatment by the formal career-development system. More-
over, because Hi-Pat line managers would receive enhanced career-de-
velopment opportunities both formally and informally, these individu-
als would also be more likely to feel more satisfied in their jobs than their 
less paternalistic co-workers. 
Based on the preceding discussion, several hypotheses for the present 
investigation may be proposed: 
Hypothesis 1: Belief in company paternalism will be positively related to self-
investment activities among Japanese line managers. 
Hypothesis 2: Belief in company paternalism will be positively related to hid-
den career investments from supervisors in Japanese organizations. 
Hypothesis 3: Belief in company paternalism will be positively related to 
quality of leader-member relationships that are developed among line 
managers and their supervisors in Japanese organizations. 
Hypothesis 4: Belief in company paternalism will be positively related to eval-
uations of the formal career-development system provided by line manag-
ers in Japanese organizations. 
Hypothesis 5: Belief in company paternalism will be positively related to job 
satisfaction among line managers in Japanese organizations. 
The above hypotheses address the main effects of paternalism on ca-
reer-development activities within an overall model of career develop-
ment. However, in order to test for the direct effect of paternalism on the 
hidden-investment process—a process that is expected to play a primary 
role in the differentiation of the right from the non-right types—it is nec-
essary to test for the contribution of belief in paternalism to hidden-in-
vestment activities after the effects of the formal career-development sys-
tem have been removed. Specifically, regardless of the line manager’s 
perceptions of the favorability of the formal career-development system, 
belief in paternalism would be expected to be positively related to hid-
den career investments. Thus: 
Hypothesis 6: The contribution of belief in company paternalism to informal 
investment processes will exist even after the effects of the evaluation of 
the formal career-development system are removed. 
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Method 
Site and Sample 
The sample used for the present study consisted of 1,075 line man-
agers working in five of the leading corporations in Japan.1 Three 
of the corporations are manufacturing firms, and two are in the ser-
vice industry. To control for possible company effects, the data were 
standardized within each company before analyses were conducted. 
Within the companies, data were collected from managers at various 
stages of career development: 261 management trainees, 417 lower-
level managers, 146 lower-middle managers, and 251 middle manag-
ers. The average age of the respondents was 39 years, and over 64% of 
the respondents had at least one university degree. The response rate 
for the study was 78.2%. 
Measures 
Predictor measure. Belief in company paternalism was assessed using 
a 5-item forced-choice measure developed for this study. This measure 
asked the line managers to indicate on a 5-point scale (from strongly 
prefer A to strongly prefer B) the extent to which they agreed with state-
ments that described extreme levels of paternalistic and nonpaternalis-
tic attitudes. The items addressed issues concerning the extent to which 
the relationship between the employee and the company was “like fam-
ily” or “basically economic and contractual,” the degree of loyalty be-
tween the company and the worker, the extent to which hard work for a 
lifetime is performed by the worker because the worker “loves the com-
pany” or because of “economic reasons,” the amount of responsibility 
the company has for enhancing the well-being of the employee and his 
family, and the degree to which the employee is responsible for remain-
ing with the company for a lifetime of employment. The Cronbach al-
pha for this measure is .70. 
Criterion measures. To test the hypotheses concerning paternalism and 
the right type for Japanese organizations, several criterion measures were 
used. These measures provide evaluations of the formal career-develop-
ment system (CDS), the informal career-development system that is con-
ducted through hidden investments, the quality of the LMX, and job 
satisfaction. The measures used to operationalize these variables are pre-
sented in the following paragraphs. 
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Evaluation of the formal career-development system in the organiza-
tion was assessed by the Career-Development System (CDS) measure. 
This measure contains 10 sets of bipolar adjectives asking line managers 
to rate (on a 7-point scale) the extent to which they would choose one ad-
jective over the other to describe the career-development system of the 
organization. Items included in this measure evaluate employee percep-
tions of the effectiveness and usefulness of the company career-develop-
ment system. The Cronbach alpha for this measure is .90. 
To evaluate informal career-investment processes, two measures of 
hidden investments, Supervisor Investment and Self-Investment Activ-
ities Inventory, were used. Supervisor Investment is a 22-item measure 
developed by Wakabayashi and Graen (Wakabayashi et al., 1990) that 
asks respondents to rate the extent to which supervisors engage in be-
haviors that characterize investment activities. Respondents indicated on 
a 5-point scale ranging from rarely to very often how often their supervisor 
engages in activities such as allowing subordinates to become involved 
in decision making, providing subordinates with special insider informa-
tion, advising the subordinate on long-range career planning, exposing 
subordinates to other departments’ functions within the organization, in-
troducing subordinates to others who may be influential in their career 
progress, and involving subordinates in special assignments. The Cron-
bach alpha for this measure is .95. 
The Self-Investment Activities Inventory is a 19-item measure (Wak-
abayashi et al., 1990) that assesses how active employees are in contrib-
uting to their own career development. Items included in this measure 
evaluate the extent to which the employee takes part in various activi-
ties that have been demonstrated to enhance one’s promotability (Graen, 
1989), such as growing out of one’s job, taking on added responsibilities, 
exercising leadership, relationship building, risk taking, and demonstrat-
ing initiative. The Cronbach alpha for this measure is .92. 
Leader-member exchange was measured using the 14-item LMX de-
veloped by Graen and colleagues (Graen & Scandura, 1987). This mea-
sure assesses the quality of the relationship between individuals and their 
immediate supervisors (Graen, Novak, & Sommerkamp, 1982; Graen & 
Scandura, 1987). The Cronbach alpha for this measure is .89. 
Finally, job satisfaction was measured using three items from the Hop-
pock Job Satisfaction Scale (Hoppock, 1935). These items ask respondents 
to indicate the extent to which they like their job, how often they feel sat-
isfied with their job, and how their job satisfaction compares with that of 
other people. The Cronbach alpha for this measure is .78. 
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Analysis 
To test the hypotheses, a two-step analysis was undertaken. In the 
first step, a correlational analysis was conducted to examine the re-
lationship between belief in company paternalism and the criterion 
variables. The results of this analysis were used to test Hypotheses 1 
through 5. In the second step, multiple regression analysis was per-
formed (Cohen & Cohen, 1975). Using this technique, both the main ef-
fects for the overall model (paternalism, career-development system) 
and the unique effect of paternalism on the dependent variables after 
partialing out the contribution of the formal career-development sys-
tem were determined. The results of these analyses were used to test 
Hypothesis 6. 
Results 
The results of the correlational analysis are presented in Table 1. The 
positive and significant relationships among belief in company paternal-
ism and the career-relevant criterion variables indicate that belief in com-
pany paternalism is related to the activities expected to be engaged in by 
right types of Japanese workers. Specifically, belief in company pater-
nalism is positively related to hidden-investment processes in Japanese 
organizations, including self-investment activities (r = .20, p < .001) and 
investments by supervisors (r =.23, p < .001). Moreover, company pater-
nalism is positively related to the quality of LMX (r = .27, p < .001), indi-
cating that Hi-Pats are more involved in high-quality LMX relationships 
than their Lo-Pat co-workers. In addition to informal career-development 
processes, belief in company paternalism is also positively related to for-
mal career-investment processes (CDS; r = .42, p < .001) and to overall 
job satisfaction (r = .33, p < .001). Although not specifically hypothesized, 
findings also demonstrate a positive relationship between hidden-in-
vestment activities and reported favorability of the formal career-devel-
opment system (CDS and self-investment: r = .19, p < .001; CDS and su-
pervisor investment: r = .26, p <. 001) and quality of LMX and reported 
favorability of the formal career-development system (CDS and LMX: r = 
.31, p < .001). 
The correlational analyses also illustrate the relationships among the 
dependent variables. Not surprisingly, these criterion variables are posi-
tively related. Because they combine to form an overall system of career 
development, it was expected that these processes would be interrelated. 
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In particular, supervisor investment and self-investment, both activities 
that require subordinates to grow out of their jobs and engage in addi-
tional developmental opportunities, are positively related (r = .51, p < 
.001). These measures are different, however, in that supervisor invest-
ments are behaviors performed by the supervisor, whereas self-invest-
ment activities are behaviors performed by the subordinate. Similarly, 
quality of the LMX relationship and supervisor investment are positively 
correlated (r = .71, p < .001). Again, these measures are different in that 
LMX measures the quality of the exchange relationship and supervisor 
investment measures the supervisor-investment activities associated with 
these exchange relationships. 
Table 2 shows the results of the multiple regression analyses. These 
findings provide support for the sixth hypothesis. In particular, even 
after the contribution of the formal career-development system is re-
moved, belief in company paternalism makes a significant contribution 
in explaining variance in the dependent variables (Fs range from 20.89 
to 67.74, all significant at the .001 level). These findings indicate that re-
gardless of the effect of formal career investments, Hi-Pat workers are 
more involved in hidden-investment processes within Japanese organi-
zations (self-investment: F = 20.89, p < .001; supervisor investment: F 
= 22.86, p < .001). Thus this test of the hidden-investment model dem-
onstrates that even after the effect of formal career investments is re-
moved, belief in company paternalism is positively related to hidden-
investment activities. 
Table 1. Product-Moment Correlations among Predictors and Criteria (N = 1,075) 
Variable  1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Paternalism [.70]
2. Career-development  
      system  .42 [.90]
3. Self-investment .20 .19 [.92]
4. Supervisor investment .23 .26 .51 [.95]
5. Leader-member  
      exchange .27 .31 .50 .71 [.89]
6. Job satisfaction .33 .28 .50 .50 .50 [.78]
All correlations are significant beyond the .001 level. Numbers in brackets represent reli-
ability coefficients. 
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Discussion 
The findings of the present study provide support for the hypothe-
ses that belief in company paternalism is positively related to enhanced 
career-development activities among line managers in Japanese organi-
zations. Hi-Pat line managers reported greater participation in both for-
mal and informal career-investment processes, greater involvement in 
the development of high-quality leader-member exchange relationships, 
and increased overall satisfaction with their job situation. Moreover, the 
contribution of strong beliefs in company paternalism to the hidden-in-
vestment process extends beyond the effect of the formal career-develop-
ment system. This is an important finding, for it suggests that regardless 
of the favorability of treatment received by the formal career-develop-
ment system, Hi-Pat line managers engage in more hidden-investment 
activities than do their Lo-Pat counterparts. Because Hi-Pat workers re-
ported greater compatibility with the career-development systems in Jap-
anese corporations, it appears that these workers are the right types for 
Japanese organizations. 
Further support for the classification of Hi-Pats as the right type for 
Japanese organizations is provided by findings of the Japanese career 
progress studies concerning the contribution of high-quality leader-
member exchanges to enhanced career progress within Japanese organi-
zations (Wakabayashi & Graen, 1984; Wakabayashi et al., 1988; Graen et 
al., 1990). In these studies, establishment of high-quality exchange rela-
Table 2. Regression Analysis of the Unique Contribution of Paternalism (N = 
1,075) 
                                                                  Unique Effect of Paternalism
                                                                              Paternalism
Measure                                                                        F
Self-investment activities 20.89*
Supervisor investment 22.86*
Leader-member exchange 29.12*
Job satisfaction 67.74*
Unique effect of paternalism is the unique effect of paternalism after effects of CDS are par-
tialed out. 
* p < .001
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tionships was found to predict career progress of Japanese line managers 
over the 13 years in which they were followed (Wakabayashi et a]., 1988). 
Moreover, LMX was found to be more predictive of Japanese career prog-
ress than the assessment center model (Bray & Grant, 1986; Bray, Camp-
bell, & Grant, 1974) and the organizational-commitment model (Porter, 
Crampton, & Smith, 1976). Thus, because high-LMX relationships have 
been found to contribute to career progress in Japanese organizations, 
and the present investigation demonstrated a positive relationship be-
tween strong beliefs in company paternalism and the establishment of 
high-quality LMX relationships, it is reasonable to assume that belief in 
company paternalism is also instrumental to enhanced career progress 
within Japanese organizations. 
The greater involvement of Hi-Pat line managers in hidden-invest-
ment processes, both self-investments and supervisor investments, also 
indicates that these right-type managers are receiving more from the sys-
tem than their Lo-Pat counterparts. The increased developmental op-
portunities in which they are participating better prepare them for ad-
vancement through the organizational hierarchy. As discussed earlier, 
enhanced informal investments may also allow these managers to receive 
more favorable treatment from the formal career-development system. 
Findings in the present study indicating a positive relationship between 
the formal career-development system and hidden-investment activities 
are again supportive of this proposition. 
Finally, the unique contribution of paternalism to the hidden-invest-
ment process after controlling for the contribution of the formal career-
development system strengthens our conclusion that we have truly found 
a career-investment process that is hidden—a process that occurs both in-
formally and over and above formal career-investment processes. By pro-
viding a vehicle through which line managers may take a more proactive 
role in their career development, these hidden-investment activities al-
low right types of Japanese line managers to differentiate themselves ef-
fectively from non-right types and thus extract more efficacious career in-
vestments within their organizations. 
In addition to these findings, the results of the current study suggest a 
question of relevance to American companies: What is the American an-
alogue of company paternalism? One reasonable candidate for the right 
type in American corporations is Hackman and Oldham’s (1976) concept 
of “growth needs.” According to Hackman and Oldham, growth needs 
are operationally defined by the Growth Need Strength (GNS) instru-
ment as the preference for work itself (intrinsic to the work), job opportu-
nities, and outcomes over nonwork itself (extrinsic to the work). Studies 
by Graen and his associates (Graen et al., 1982; Graen, Scandura, & Graen, 
1986; Graen, 1989, 1990) show that high-GNS people more readily accept 
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the challenges of higher quality LMX relationships and respond with im-
proved productivity than do low- or moderate-GNS people. Therefore, 
high-GNS people are more likely to make greater personal investments 
in their careers and receive greater investments, both formal and infor-
mal, from their bosses than are their lower-GNS colleagues. 
A similarity between Hi-Pats in Japanese companies and high GNSs 
in American companies is worthy of note. Although the Hi-Pats commit 
themselves to their companies and strive to add value in their work for 
the benefit of something to which they deeply identify (their company), 
the high GNSs commit and endeavor to enhance the value of something 
to which they deeply identify (their work). Thus both find something be-
yond their own self-interests to justify their dedication. We may specu-
late that this additional job investment may be characteristic of most cor-
porate right types. 
A practical implication of this study is that it emphasizes the impor-
tance of matching potential employees with their particular company 
cultures. In addition, these companies should attempt to design career-
development systems that will maximize the contribution of their right 
types. Every company has its own culture, which must be understood be-
fore it can be harnessed to make it more productive. Unfortunately, many 
companies expend greater effort denying their cultures and their right 
types than capitalizing on them for the good of their competitive posi-
tions in their markets. This is a lesson that we must learn from our inter-
national competitors-we need to make our own unique hidden systems 
work for our companies. 
Note 
1. The sample consisted of line managers from various hierarchical levels throughout the 
organization. To ensure that these levels were not influencing the findings, an additional 
analysis was conducted that tested for these effects across each hierarchical level. The re-
sults of these analyses indicated that there were no differences by job level and that the 
findings held regardless of hierarchical status within the organization. 
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